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THE JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PARENT-CHILD
TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGE: TOO BIG FOR ITS BRITCHES?
Despite a substantial body of commentary favoring a parent-
child testimonial privilege,1 the privilege has been recognized only
by the state courts of New York2 and the federal district courts of
Connecticut and Nevada.3 Two New York cases " developed a nar-
row privilege that allows parents to refuse to testify about confi-
dential communications from their children. Both decisions based
this limited privilege primarily on the familial right to privacy,5
although one of the courts also suggested that the privilege resem-
bles the widely recognized husband-wife testimonial privilege.6 In a
more recent case, In re Agosto,7 the United States District Court
1. See, e.g., Coburn, Child-Parent Communications: Spare the Privilege and Spoil the
Child, 74 DICK. L. REV. 599 (1970); Stanton, Child-Parent Privilege for Confidential Com-
munications: An Examination and Proposal, 16 FAy. L.Q. 1 (1982); Comment, From the
Mouths of Babes: Does the Constitutional Right of Privacy Mandate a Parent-Child Privi-
lege?, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1002 [hereinafter cited as Comment, Constitutional Privilege];
Comment, The Child-Parent Privilege: A Proposal, 47 FoRDHAM L. Ray. 771 (1979) [herein-
after cited as Comment, A Proposal]; Comment, Recognition of a Parent-Child Testimonial
Privilege, 23 ST. Louis U.L.J. 676 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Recognition of
Privilege]; Comment, Confidential Communication Between Parent and Child: A Constitu-
tional Right, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 811 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Confidential
Communication]; Comment, Underprivileged Communications: The Rationale for a Par-
ent-Child Testimonial Privilege, 36 Sw. L.J. 1175 (1983) [hereainfter cited as Comment,
Underprivileged Communications]. But see Note, Questioning the Recognition of a Parent-
Child Testimonial Privilege, 45 Aim. L. REv. 142 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Ques-
tioning the Privilege].
2. New York was the first jurisdiction to recognize the privilege. See In re A and M, 61
A.D.2d 426, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978); People v. Fitzgerald, 101 Misc. 2d 712,
422 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Westchester County Ct. 1979); see also People v. Harrell, 87 A.D.2d 21
(1982) (N.Y. App. Div.) (recognizing the privilege developed in A and M and Fitzgerald).
3. Federal district courts in Nevada and Connecticut have recognized a parent-child priv-
ilege. See In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298 (D. Nev. 1983); In re Grand Jury Proceedings
(Greenberg), 11 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. (Callaghan) 579 (D. Conn. 1982).
4. In re A and M, 61 A.D.2d 426, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978); People v.
Fitzgerald, 101 Misc. 2d 712, 422 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Westchester County Ct. 1979).
5. See In re A and M, 61 A.D.2d 426, 429-32, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375, 378-80 (N.Y. App. Div.
1978); People v. Fitzgerald, 101 Misc. 2d 712, 716-17, 422 N.Y.S.2d 309, 312-13 (Westchester
County Ct. 1979).
6. See People v. Fitzgerald, 101 Misc. 2d 712, 720, 422 N.Y.S.2d 309, 315 (Westchester
County Ct. 1979).
7. 553 F. Supp. 1298 (D. Nev. 1983).
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for the District of Nevada recognized a much broader privilege.
Agosto expanded the parent-child privilege to include confidential
communications from parents as well as from children. 8 The court
concluded that the privilege exempts either party from testifying
against the other in criminal proceedings. 9
Although both courts and commentators have recognized the
need for a parent-child privilege, 10 no legislature has enacted one.11
Similarly, many courts have declined to create a parent-child privi-
lege. 1 2 Opponents of the privilege contend that the public interest
in having access to all relevant evidence outweighs the interests
protected by a parent-child testimonial privilege. 13
This Note reviews the requirements for testimonial privileges
and briefly discusses the purpose and history of some of the ex-
isting privileges. The Note then turns to the judicial development
of the parent-child privilege, examining the major cases that have
recognized this privilege. After discussing of the issues raised by
these cases, the Note recommends acceptance of a limited parent-
child privilege.
BACKGROUND OF THE PARENT-CHILD PRIVILEGE
General Requirements for Testimonial Privileges
Testimonial privileges are an exception to the general rule "that
'the public . . .has a right to every man's evidence.' " 4 Because
testimonial privileges obstruct the search for truth, courts construe
8. See id. at 1325.
9. See id.
10. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
11. Legislators have introduced bills to enact a parent-child privilege in both New York
(H. Res. 8502/S. Res. 9965, 203d Leg., 1st Sess. (1980)) and Minnesota (S. Res. 1782, 72d
Leg., 1st Sess. (1981)), but neither passed.
12. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 683 F.2d 817 (4th Cir. 1982); In re Starr, 647 F.2d
511 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Penn, 647 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1980); In re Kinoy, 326 F.
Supp. 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); In re Terry W., 59 Cal. App. 3d 745, 130 Cal. Rptr. 913 (1976);
Cissna v. State, 170 Ind. App. 437, 352 N.E.2d 793 (1976); State v. Gilroy, 313 N.W.2d 513
(Iowa 1981); Three Juveniles v. Commonwealth, 390 Mass. 357, 455 N.E.2d 1203 (1983) (re-
jecting adverse testimony privilege).
13. See, e.g., Note, Questioning the Privilege, supra note 1, at 174-77.
14. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974) (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665, 688 (1972)); see also 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2192 (J. McNaughton rev. ed.
1961) (origin of the phrase).
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them narrowly. 15 Furthermore, because the proper administration
of justice depends largely on the court's ability to hear all relevant
evidence, courts resist both expansion of existing privileges and
creation of new ones."' Dean Wigmore stated four widely accepted
prerequisites for the recognition of testimonial privileges:
1) the communications must originate in confidence that they
will not be disclosed;
2) this element of confidentiality must be essential to the full
and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the
parties;
3) the relation must be one which, in the opinion of society,
ought to be sedulously fostered; and
4) the injury that would inure to the relation by the disclos-
ure of the communication must be greater than the benefit
thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation.17
Although helpful in analyzing new claims of privilege, this test
cannot provide a definitive answer in any particular case. Instead,
the recognition of a privilege depends largely on the deci-
sionmaker's personal values. The subjective element of the Wig-
more formula is especially evident in the part of the test that re-
15. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980).
16. See supra note 12.
17. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 14, § 2285 (emphasis in original). Another commentator has
formulated a different test that focuses on whether the privilege satisfies the following emo-
tions and desires:
1) Instinctive revulsion against the betrayal of a confidence.
2) A sense of compassion even for a transgressor, i.e. a feeling that there
should be for every man some sanctuary beyond the reach of society's law
where he may safely confide his guilty secrets in an attempt to ease his troub-
led spirit.
3) A sense of fair play related to the Norman view of a lawsuit as a species of
contest or sporting event wherein it would be too easy, and hence unfair and
against the 'rules of the game,' to hound a man to his doom by convicting him
through the lips of his own intimate friends, family, or medical, legal, or spiri-
tual advisors.
4) A desire to preserve the function of certain socially valuable relationships
even at the cost of occasional suppression of the truth and injustice in such,
presumably few, particular cases.
5) A feeling of individual and professional pride and self-importance in being
the inviolable repository of others' secrets.
Manley, Patient, Penitent, Client and Spouse in New York, 21 N.Y. ST. B.A. BuLL. 288, 290
(1949).
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quires balancing injury against benefit. Comparison of the parent-
child privilege with the more commonly recognized privileges pro-
vides a better analytical standard.
The Professional Privileges
Attorney-Client
The attorney-client privilege existed in Roman law18 and in early
English law.19 The early common law courts reasoned that the law-
yer, as a gentleman, should not besmirch his honor by revealing his
client's secrets. 20 This "point of honor" rationale lost favor by the
early nineteenth century when the reason for maintaining confi-
dentiality shifted to the needs of the client.21 Courts came to view
the privilege as a necessary device to allay the client's fears that
his attorney might reveal the client's confidences.22 The privilege
encourages those in need of legal services to consult with attorneys
and to exercise candor in dealing with them.23 Without this free-
dom of communication, attorneys would be unable to represent
their clients effectively. Indeed, the constitutional guarantees of
the right to counsel in criminal cases, as well as the due process
guarantees of the fifth and fourteenth amendments, seem to man-
date recognition of the attorney-client privilege.24
The federal courts and each of the states recognize the attorney-
client privilege.25 The privilege protects communications made in
confidence for the purpose of seeking legal advice from a member
of the bar. 8 Such communications are protected permanently from
18. Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Communication Between Lawyer and Client, 16
CALIF. L. Rav. 487, 488 (1928).
19. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 14, § 2290.
20. Id.
21. Id; C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 87 (2d ed. 1972).
22. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950)
(enunciating a widely accepted test for the applicability of the attorney-client privilege); C.
MCCORMICK, supra note 21, § 87; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 14, § 2290.
23. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 14, § 2291.
24. Cf. D. MELLINKOFF, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LAwYER 149-55 (1973); Freedman, Profes-
sional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64
MICH. L. REv. 1469 (1966).
25. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 14, § 2292 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961 & Supp.
1983); see also C. MCCORMICK, supra note 21, § 87.
26. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 14, § 2292; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 21, § 87.
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compelled disclosure.27 Only the client holds the privilege; if he
waives it, the attorney has no independent claim to the privilege.28
Priest-Penitent
The common law did not recognize the priest-penitent privi-
lege.29 Most states now recognize the privilege by statute, 0 how-
ever, although its scope varies among jurisdictions. 1 The privilege
protects confidential communications between a clergyman acting
in the capacity of a spiritual advisor and a person seeking help.32
The priest-penitent privilege resembles the attorney-client privi-
lege because the clergyman can serve the needs of those seeking his
aid effectively only when full disclosure is not inhibited by the fear
of a later betrayal of confidence. As with the attorney-client privi-
lege, this privilege belongs to the person seeking the clergyman's
help, but the clergyman may claim the privilege on that person's
behalf. 3
Physician-Patient
The physician-patient privilege also was not recognized at com-
mon law.3 4 The privilege appeared in statutory form as early as
1828, 5 however, and now exists statutorily in more than two-thirds
of the states.36 The purpose of this privilege is to encourage pa-
27. See supra note 26.
28. 8 J. WIGMOim, supra note 14, § 2321; see also C. MCCORMICK, supra note 21, § 92.
29. Stoyles, The Dilemma of the Constitutionality of the Priest-Penitent Privilege-The
Application of the Religion Clauses, 29 U. Prrr. L. REV. 27, 32 (1967). Most authorities
maintain that the common law did not recognize this privilege. See, e.g., Coburn, supra note
1, at 609.
30. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 21, § 77. All but four states-Alabama, Connecticut, Mis-
sissippi, and New Hampshire-have recognized the privilege by statute. Id.
31. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 14, § 2395 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961 & Supp. 1983)
(collecting statutes).
32. See PROPOSED FED. R. Evm. 506(b). Although Proposed Rule 506 reflects the more
progressive version of the priest-penitent privilege, there is another version of the privilege
narrowly tailored to confessions that are doctrinally required. See PROPOSED FED. R. Evm.
506 advisory committee note; see also Ui F. R. Evm. 29 (exemplifying the more restrictive
version of the privilege).
33. See PROPOSED FED. R. Evm. 506(c).
34. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 14, § 2380.
35. C. McCoRMIcK, supra note 21, § 98 (citing the seminal New York statute).
36. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 14, § 2380 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961 & Supp. 1983).
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tients to seek the help of a physician and to make available to him
the facts necessary for proper treatment."7 Without such a privi-
lege, a patient might withhold private or embarrassing information
essential to proper diagnosis and care.38
Despite its wide acceptance, some commentators question the
need for a physician-patient privilege.39 Some critics contend, for
example, that the privilege is unnecessary because even if patients
expect confidentiality, a privilege is not essential to the relation-
ship because a patient's desire for treatment always will lead them
to seek a physician.40 Other critics maintain that the privilege is
harmful because it shields the commission of medical insurance
fraud.41 Finally, in many jurisdictions the privilege is so riddled
with exceptions that its effectiveness is questionable.42
As with other privileges, the Federal Rules of Evidence leave the
existence of the physician-patient privilege to be determined by
the common law of the states.43 Contrary to the treatment of the
other privileges, however, the physician-patient privilege is con-
spicuously absent from the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence.44
Psychotherapist-Patient
The psychotherapist-patient privilege has gained wide accept-
ance in recent years. Although some states do not recognize it as a
distinct privilege, many of these grant a privilege to a broader
group that subsumes psychotherapists, including psychiatrists,45
psychologists, 46 or other counselors. 47 The psyschotherapist-patient
37. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 14, § 98.
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., 8 J. WIGMOR, supra note 14, § 2380a. Wigmore asserts that the physician-
patient privilege in practice results in the suppression of facts that properly should be dis-
closed. Id; see also Chafee, Privileged Communications: Is Justice Served or Obstructed by
Closing the Doctor's Mouth on the Witness Stand?, 52 YALE L.J. 607 (1943); Morgan, Sug-
gested Remedy for Obstructions to Expert Testimony by Rules of Evidence, 10 U. CH. L.
Rav. 285 (1943).
40. See, e.g., 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 14, § 2380a.
41. See, e.g., C. McCoRMICK, supra note 21, § 105.
42. PROPOSED FED. R. Evm. 504 advisory committee note.
43. See FED. R. Evi. 501.
44. See PROPOsED FED. R. EviD. 504 advisory committee note.
45. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 14, § 2286 n.23.
46. Id.
47. See Comment, A Proposal, supra note 1, at 779-80. In addition, a psychotherapist
[Vol. 26:145
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relationship easily meets the second criterion of the Wigmore
formula because extremely personal and private revelations are
usually essential to the proper treatment of mental and emotional
disorders. Patients would be unlikely to make these sensitive reve-
lations without a guarantee of privacy.48 This was the primary rea-
son that the Advisory Committee offered for including a psycho-
therapist-patient privilege in the Proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence. As the Committee explained, the psychiatrist has a spe-
cial need for confidentiality beyond that of the ordinary
physician.49
Similarities Between the Professional Privileges and the Par-
ent-Child Privilege
The parent-child relationship is analogous to the privileged pro-
fessional relationships in many respects. As the professional exer-
cises his skills in the delicate relationship with his client, the par-
ent plays a unique and sensitive role in the life of his "client," the
child. In fulfilling this role, the parent must assume many of the
same responsibilities as professionals. The parent, for example,
often must serve as the child's legal advisor, spiritual counselor,
and physical and emotional health expert. The necessity for confi-
dentiality is comparable to that within the professional relation-
ships. Like the attorney, priest, or psychiatrist, parents must es-
tablish an atmosphere of trust to facilitate free and open
communication. Proponents of the parent-child privilege argue
that if courts can compel parents to reveal the contents of their
children's confidential communications, the family, and, ulti-
potentially could qualify as a physician for purposes of an applicable physician-patient priv-
ilege, provided he is properly licensed or certified. See In re Brenda H., 119 N.H. 382, 402
A.2d 169 (1979) (implying that a patient's communications to a therapist would have been
privileged under either a physician-patient privilege or a psychologist-patient privilege had
she been a licensed physician or a certified psychologist). But see 8 J. WGMORE, supra note
14, § 2382 n.5 ("Psychologists (as distinguished from psychiatrists, who are professional
physicians) are not included within the [physician-patient] privilege") (emphasis in
original)).
48. See PROPOSED FED. R. EVm. 504 advisory commmittee note (quoting GRouP FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, Report No. 45, at 92 (1960)); Slovenko, Psychiatry and a
Second Look at the Medical Privilege, 6 WAYNE L. REv. 175, 184-85 (1960).
49. PROPOSED FED. R. EviD. 504 advisory committee note.
1984]
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mately, society will suffer. 0 An analysis of the well established
husband-wife privilege exposes a similar concern for the integrity
of a relationship essential to societal stability.
The Husband-Wife Privilege
Adverse- Testimony Privilege
The husband-wife privilege collectively refers to two distinct
privileges: a privilege for confidential marital communications, and
the adverse-testimony or "anti-marital fact" privilege.5' The privi-
lege against adverse spousal testimony stems from the common law
concept of the husband and wife as a single entity, as well as from
the common law rule that one could not testify in any action in
which he had an interest.52 Thus, at early common law, husbands
and wives could not testify either for or against each other. Al-
though modern rules of evidence discourage recognition of this
concept of spousal incompetency,5 3 the adverse-testimony privilege
nevertheless persists in two forms: the first variant permits a
spouse to resist testifying against the other; the second variant al-
lows a spouse to prevent the other from testifying.54
The adverse-testimony privilege serves mainly to prevent mari-
tal disharmony.55 Another reason for this aspect of the husband-
wife privilege is society's "natural repugnance" for using the testi-
mony of one spouse to convict the other.56 The adverse-testimony
privilege exists to protect the marriage itself rather than to protect
particular spousal communications. Thus, the operation of this
privilege depends not on the existence of confidential communica-
tions but rather on the "anti-marital" nature of the testimony
sought. Although commentators have criticized this privilege as
50. See, e.g., Coburn, supra note 1, at 625-32; Stanton, supra note 1, at 66-67; Comment, -
A Proposal, supra note 1, at 806-07.
51. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 14, §§ 2333-2334.
52. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 44 (1980); Stanton, supra note 1, at 4.
53. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 48 n.9 (1980) (indicating that only eight
states now provide that one spouse always is incompetent to testify against the other in a
criminal proceeding).
54. PROPOSED FED. R. Evw. 505 advisory committee note. See generally 8 J. WIGMORE,
supra note 14, § 2241.
55. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 44 (1980).
56. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 14, § 2228.
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anachronistic and unjustified,57 approximately half of the states
recognize it.5 8 When the United States Supreme Court recently re-
considered this privilege in Trammel v. United States,59 the Court
only modified it by vesting the privilege solely in the testifying
spouse.10 Thus, in federal criminal proceedings, the privilege
against adverse spousal testimony rests entirely with the testifying
spouse. The court cannot compel the witness to testify; the accused
spouse cannot prevent the witness from testifying."1
Confidential Communication Privilege
The husband-wife privilege for confidential communications pro-
hibits testimony by either spouse relating to confidential communi-
cations occurring during their marriage.6 2 The privilege encourages
open communication within the marriage and thereby fosters a re-
lationship valuable to society. Permitting courts to compel dis-
closure of marital confidences might undermine the trust beneficial
to marriage.64 The privilege also stems from society's reluctance to
force a spouse to reveal intimate or embarrassing marital confi-
dences.6 5 The privilege protects only communications between a
lawfully married couple that originate in confidence.6
57. Wigmore calls the privilege against adverse marital testimony an "anachronism in le-
gal theory and an indefensible obstruction to truth in practice." Id.; see also Hutchins &
Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence: Family Relations, 13 MINN. L. Rv.
675 (1929).
58. Besides the eight states that provide that one spouse always is incompetent to testify
against another, sixteen states provide a privilege against adverse testimony that vests the
privilege either in both spouses or solely with the testifying spouse. See Trammel v. United
States, 445 U.S. 40, 48 n.9 (1980) (collecting statutes). Nine other states provide a privilege
against compelled adverse testimony held by the testifying spouse alone. Id. The remaining .
seventeen states have abolished the adverse-testimony privilege in criminal cases. Id.
59. 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
60. Id. at 52-53. The Court reasoned that when one spouse is willing to testify adversely
against the other, marital harmony probably no longer exists anyway. Id.
61. Id. at 53. Neither spouse, however, may reveal confidential marital communications
without the other's consent. See infra text accompanying notes 62-70.
62. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980); Blau v. United States, 340 U.S.
332, 333 (1951); Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 14 (1934).
63. See generally 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 14, § 2332.
64. Id.; Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in Federal Court
Today, 31 TuL. L. REv. 101, 113 (1956).
65. C. McCoRmICK, supra note 21, § 86.
66. See generally 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 14, §§ 2335-37.
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Commentators contend that the privilege is unnecessary because
married couples generally are unaware of its existence.17 Because
the mutual trust probably will exist in the relationship in any case,
these commentators contend that no privilege is necessary to en-
courage it."8 Many others have defended the privilege forcefully,6 9
however, and the privilege is in no danger. Indeed, the elimination
of the confidential communications privilege in the Proposed Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence provoked a storm of controversy in Con-
gress, causing at least in part Congress' rejection of the rules on
privileges.
70
Similarities Between the Husband-Wife and Parent-Child
Privileges
Similar policies underlie both the husband-wife and the parent-
child testimonial privileges. Proponents of a parent-child privilege
maintain that protecting one relationship but not the other is in-
consistent.7 1 The two relationships are difficult to distinguish
within the Wigmore formula. Recent United States Supreme Court
decisions protecting minors' rights72 and family privacy"3 further
67. See, e.g., C. MCCORMCK, supra note 21, § 86; Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 57, at
682. The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence omitted a marital privilege for confidential
communications because marital conduct was unlikely to "be affected by a privilege for con-
fidential communications of whose existence the parties are in all likelihood unaware." PRO-
POSED FED. R. Evm. 505 advisory committee note.
68. See supra note 67.
69. See, e.g., 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 14, § 2332; Stanton, supra note 1, at 6; Comment,
Recognition of Privilege, supra note 1, at 683-84.
70. In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1323-25 (D. Nev. 1983); Comment, Recognition of
Privilege, supra note 1, at 684.
71. See, e.g., In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1325-26 (D. Nev. 1983); Stanton, supra note
1, at 7; Comment, A Proposal, supra note 1, at 773-74.
72. The United States Supreme Court's holding in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), that a
juvenile has a privilege against self-incrimination in a juvenile delinquency hearing was the
immediate stimulus of the recent interest in a parent-child privilege. See Coburn, supra
note 1, at 599-600. In Beilotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979), the Court upheld minors' right
to abortion without parental consent. The opinion cautioned, however, that the rights of
minors are not equivalent with those of adults. Id. at 635; see also Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (minors, as well as adults, possess constitutional rights); In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (proof beyond reasonable doubt required for conviction of
juvenile); Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (minors' right to freedom
of expression).
73. See infra note 81 and accompanying text. For a thorough discussion of the constitu-
tional bases of the parent-child privilege, see Stanton, supra note 1, at 13-37; Comment,
PARENT-CHILD PRIVILEGE
cloud any distinction. Although these two relationships are equally
important, the law protects one far more than the other. This im-
balance has prompted courts to recognize a parent-child privilege.
CASES RECOGNIZING A PARENT-CHILD PRIVILEGE
In re A and M
The seminal case concerning the parent-child testimonial privi-
lege is In re A and M.7 4 State prosecutors alleged that a sixteen-
year-old boy started a fire at a New York college.75 The district
attorney subpoenaed the boy's parents, hoping to obtain evidence
against their son. 6 The County Court of Erie County New York
quashed the subpoenas, holding that the marital privilege encom-
passes a parent-child privilege and that the constitutional right to
privacy protects confidential intrafamilial communications. 77
The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court rejected
the portion of the trial court's reasoning that recognized a parent-
child privilege within the husband-wife privilege. The court recog-
nized that the New York statute on marital privileges restricts the
privilege to communications between husband and wife."' The
court affirmed, however, that compelled disclosure of these com-
munications would compromise constitutionally protected family
interests.79 Although no statute protected the communications, the
court held that "a host of cases which have given constitutional
dimension to matters concerning the relational interests of parents
and children... acknowledge[d] 'a private realm of family life the
state cannot enter.' "80 As the court observed, these cases"1 demon-
Constitutional Privilege, supra note 1, at 1012-23; Comment, Confidential Communication,
supra note 1, at 819-27.
74. 61 A.D.2d 426, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978).
75. Id. at 428, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 377.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. (construing N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 4502(b) (McKinney 1963)).
79. In re A and M, 61 A.D.2d 426, 432, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375, 379-80 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978).
80. Id. at 429-30, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 378 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166
(1944)).
81. The court cited the following cases: Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632
(1974) (striking down a law requiring mandatory pregnancy leave for teachers); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to abortion without state interference during first trimes-
ter of pregnancy); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (state may not interfere with un-
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strated the Supreme Court's recognition of constitutional rights to
marital8 2 and familial privacy.83
In A and M the court stressed the importance of the parents'
role in the child's development of self image, character, and emo-
tional stability." The court also considered the importance of trust
in the family:
It would be difficult to think of a situation which more strikingly
embodies the intimate and confidential relationship which exists
among family members than that in which a troubled young
person, perhaps beset with remorse and guilt, turns for counsel
and guidance to his mother and father. There is nothing more
natural, more consistent with our concept of the parental role,
than that a child may rely on his parents for help and advice.
Shall it be said to those parents, 'Listen to your son at the risk
of being compelled to testify about his confidences?'8 5
Although it stated that these circumstances pass Wigmore's
four-part test,86 the court declined to openly recognize a parent-
child privilege because "the creation of a privilege devolves exclu-
sively on the Legislature."87 Despite this apparent deference, the
decision created at least a limited privilege for children's commu-
nications to their parents for the purpose of obtaining guidance
and counsel.8  Because an absolute privilege might undermine pa-
rental control of children, the court carefully limited the protection
wed father's custody rights absent neglect); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (paren-
tal right to give child religious education outweighs state interest in compulsory public
education); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (minors and obscenity); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (recognizing a constitutional right to marital privacy
within the penumbra of specifically enumerated constitutional rights); Prince v. Massachu-
setts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (state may intervene in parent-child relationship to enforce child
labor law); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1923) (parental right to control child's
upbringing); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (upholding right of parent to control
child's education); see also In re A and M, 61 A.D.2d 426, 430, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375, 378 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1978).
82. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see supra note 81.
83. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (barring state interference
with individual's choice to reside with extended family).
84. In re A and M, 61 A.D.2d 426, 432, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375, 380 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978).
85. Id. at 429, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 378.
86. Id. at 434, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 381; see supra note 17 and accompanying text.
87. In re A and M, 61 A.D.2d 426, 434-35, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375, 381.
88. See id. at 433-34, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 380.
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to those cases in which both the parents and the child sought the
privilege.8 9
People v. Fitzgerald
Two years after A and M the New York parent-child privilege
entered a further stage of development. In People v. Fitzgerald,"
the County Court of Westchester County New York recognized a
parent-child testimonial privilege "grounded in law, logic, morality
and ethics."9 1 The prosecution had attempted to compel a father
to testify against his twenty-three-year-old son after the son's in-
volvement in a fatal hit-and-run accident.92 The father testified
about the conversations under subpoena to the grand jury. Before
trial, however, both father and son moved to suppress this com-
pelled testimony on the ground that a parent-child privilege pro-
tected it.9' The state opposed the motion, arguing that no such
privilege existed, and that even if it did exist, the father's earlier
testimony constituted a waiver.9 5
Relying on A and M, the constitutional right to privacy cases, 98
and notions of family integrity,97 the court held that a parent-child
testimonial privilege existed in New York despite its absence from
the statutes.98 The court stated that "[s]ince such a privilege flows
directly from Federally protected constitutional rights of privacy,
89. Id. at 435 n.9, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 381 n.9.
90. 101 Misc. 2d 712, 422 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Westchester County Ct. 1979).
91. Id. at 713, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 310.
92. Id. at 714, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 310. A vehicle struck two women walking at night along a
snow covered road. The authorities believed that the son was the offending driver and
charged him with negligent homicide. Id. at 713, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 310.
93. Id. at 714, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 310. The grand jury testimony occurred before the decision
in A and M. Id. at 722, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 316. The father therefore was unaware of the exis-
tence of the privilege and asserted no claim to it. Id.
94. Id. at 712, 714, 422 N.Y.S.2d 309, 310-11 (Westchester County Ct. 1979).
95. See id.
96. The court cited the following cases as sources of this right- Moore v. East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494 (1977); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158 (1944); see also supra note 81.
97. People v. Fitzgerald, 101 Misc. 2d 712, 716, 422 N.Y.S.2d 309, 312 (Westchester
County Ct. 1979). The court stressed not only the need to foster ongoing communications
between parent and child but also the injustice of forcing a parent to choose between his
child's loyalty and the state's demands. See infra notes 191-193 and accompanying text.
98. People v. Fitzgerald, 101 Misc. 2d 712, 716-17, 422 N.Y.S.2d 309, 314 (Westchester
County Ct. 1979).
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it is a question of law which is appropriate for this court's decision,
notwithstanding the lack of legislative recognition of such a funda-
mental right to date."9  The court found that the likely injury to
the parent-child relationship outweighed the state's interest in dis-
posing of litigation.100
Fitzgerald expanded the scope of the parent-child privilege in
two respects: first, by extending the privilege to adults as well as to
minors; and second, by acknowledging the child's independent
right to assert the privilege. Whereas A and M protected "commu-
nications made by a minor child to his parents," 101 Fitzgerald re-
jected age distinctions as arbitrary and artificial. 0 2 Because the
purpose of the privilege is the protection of the parent-child rela-
tionship, the court found no justification for denying the privilege
to adults. 0 3 Accordingly, it ruled that the ongoing nature of the
parent-child relationship demanded that the privilege "not be lim-
ited by the age of either party.' 0 4
Through an analogy to the husband-wife privilege, the court
ruled that the father's testimony before the grand jury did not
waive his right to avoid testifying at trial. 0 5 Because both husband
and wife must consent to any disclosure of confidential communi-
cations, 0 6 disclosure of confidential communications between par-
ent and child also required joint consent. 0 7 The court noted that
parents could waive the privilege under certain circumstances,
such as when they wished to divulge communications to enlist the
court's aid in supervising the child. 08 The court would not require
99. Id. at 717, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 313.
100. See id. at 716, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 312.
101. In re A and M, 61 A.D.2d 426, 435, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375, 381 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978)
(emphasis added).
102. People v. Fitzgerald, 101 Misc. 2d 712, 718-20, 422 N.Y.S.2d 309, 313-14 (Westches-
ter County Ct. 1979).
103. See id. Because the privilege flows from the constitutional right to privacy inherent
in the parent-child relationship, the court held that the state was forbidden by law to im-
pose an age limit. Id. at 719-20, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 314. The court also pointed out that no
other privilege was restricted by age requirements. Id. at 720, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 314.
104. Id. at 720, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 314.
105. See id. at 720, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 315.
106. Id.; see supra note 62 and accompanying text.
107. People v. Fitzgerald, 101 Misc. 2d 712, 721, 422 N.Y.S.2d 309, 315 (Westchester
County Ct. 1979).
108. See id.
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joint consent in this situation because the state would be protect-
ing the relationship rather than invading it.'09 Combined with pa-
rental interests, the state interests would outweigh the child's right
to privacy.110 In Fitzgerald, however, both parties opposed
disclosure.""'
The Fitzgerald opinion does not propose that a child may assert
this independent privilege against his parent's wishes. Rather, the
court preserves the child's privilege when the parents accidentally
waive their own rights, but a parent seeking court assistance in
controlling the child could override the child's privilege.11 2 The
court did not address the possibility that a parent might seek to
disclose confidential information for some less noble motive, such
as revenge. The opinion does not rule out a truly independent priv-
ilege in those circumstances,113 but the difficulty in proving unsa-
vory motives suggests that parents will retain effective veto power.
In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Greenberg)
In re Greenberg'1 4 represents the first case in which a federal
court recognized a parent-child privilege. In Greenberg, a mother
sought relief from a civil contempt charge for refusing to testify
against her adult daughter.""5 A Florida grand jury indicted the
daughter on charges of importing marijuana.""" Simultaneously, a
grand jury in Connecticut was investigating crimes involving the
same importation scheme.117 The Connecticut grand jury subpoe-
naed the mother because she had visited her daughter at the time
109. See id.
110. Id. The situation was different in Fitzgerald because both the parent and the child
joined to oppose the state's interest. Id. at 714, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 310. Although the father did
not object to testifying before the grand jury, the court found that his testimony was not
voluntary. Id. at 722, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 316. The court decided that he simply was unaware of
his right to claim the privilege and thus had not waived it by testifying before the grand
jury. See id.
111. Id. at 714, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 310.
112. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
113. Fitzgerald reaches no definite conclusion regarding the parent's ability to waive the
privilege, but the court indicated that it would allow parental waiver when in the best inter-
ests of the child.
114. 11 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. (Callaghan) 579 (D. Conn. 1982).
115. See id. at 579-80. The opinion does not indicate the age of the adult daughter.
116. Id. at 580.
117. Id. at 581.
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of the alleged importation and may have had pertinent informa-
tion about the operation.118
I The mother supported her claim to a testimonial privilege with
an affidavit stating that she and her children were conservative
Jews and that the Jewish religion forbids a parent to testify
against her child.119 The mother submitted the affidavit of a rabbi
to confirm this theological point.120 The United States District
Court for the District of Connecticut found that the mother's faith
precluded her from testifying against her child.' 21
The court then analyzed two distinct parent-child privileges: a
religiously based privilege against giving incriminating testi-
mony,122 and a common law privilege protecting a family's confi-
dential communications. 23 Both raised constitutional issues. De-
nial of the religious privilege would violate first amendment rights;
denial of the privilege for confidential parent-child communica-
tions might impinge on the right of family privacy. 24 The availa-
bility of either privilege depended on whether the individual inter-
ests outweighed the state's interest in obtaining evidence. 2 5
Relying on the opinion of United States Supreme Court in
Branzburg v. Hayes,2 6 the court found that generally "the interest
of the grand jury in obtaining testimony must prevail over a wit-
ness' First Amendment religious rights."' 27 The court stated, how-
ever, that it would accommodate the mother's wishes if it could do
118. Id.
119. Id. at 581-82. The authority adduced was Sanhedrin 27B of the Babylonian Talmud.
Id. n.6.
120. Id. at 581-82.
121. See id.
122. See id. at 582-84.
123. See id. at 584-87.
124. Id. at 582.
125. Id.
126. 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (holding that the journalists' claim of a first amendment privi-
lege must be subordinated to the duty of every citizen to appear before the grand jury).
127. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Greenberg), 11 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. (Callaghan) 579,
583 (D. Conn. 1982). The court noted that the United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit rejected a similar claim of religious privilege in Smiow v. United States, 465
F.2d 802 (2d Cir. 1972), vacated on other grounds, 409 U.S. 944 (1972). Aside from the
absence of any familial relationship in Smilow, the court distinguished the case as one in
which granting the privilege would have halted the investigation. In re Grand Jury Proceed-
ings (Greenberg), 11 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. (Callaghan) 579, 583 (D. Conn. 1982).
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so without unduly hindering the grand jury.12 Because incriminat-
ing testimony only would be testimony against the child, the court
limited the mother's privilege to answers that would implicate her
daughter.129 Inasmuch as other witnesses were available to testify
about the daughter's activities, 130 the court concluded that the
mother's testimony was "not essential to the grand jury investiga-
tion. .... 1"' The court held that the government's interest in the
testimony did not outweigh the mother's first amendment rights.""
Because a religiously based privilege exempted the mother from
incriminating her daughter, the court had no need to decide
whether a privilege based on family privacy also protected incrimi-
nating testimony. 33
The remaining issue was whether a common law privilege never-
theless protected communications not incriminating to the daugh-
ter. The collision of constitutionally protected interests compli-
cated the issue. The court stated that the grand jury investigation
must take precedence unless doing so "would violate society's in-
terest, also of constitutional magnitude, in fostering the parent-
child relationship.' 34 The court applied the Wigmore test13 and
found that the mother-daughter conversations met the first three
requirements: the communications had originated in confidence;
confidentiality was essential to the parent-child relationship; and
the relationship was valuable to society.' The fourth part of the
test required the court to balance the likely harm to the family
against the benefit of the testimony to the state. The court pointed
out that the daughter, as an adult, did not require the same degree
128. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Greenberg), 11 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. (Callaghan) 579,
582 (D. Conn. 1982).
129. See id. at 584.
130. Id. at 584. The availability of other witnesses presumably able to supply the same
information sought from Mrs. Greenberg prevented her claim of privilege from frustrating
the investigation. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
131. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Greenberg), 11 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. (Callaghan) 579,
584 (D. Conn. 1982).
132. See id.
133. Id. at 585.
134. Id.
135. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
136. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Greenberg) 11 Fed. R. Evid. .Serv. (Callaghan) 579,
585-86 (D. Conn. 1982).
1984]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:145
of guidance, counsel, and support as a child.31 Accordingly, al-
though compelled disclosure of nonincriminating confidences
might damage the relationship, the harm would be less severe than
if a minor were involved. 138 The court found that this lesser degree
of harm did not outweigh the state's need for the testimony. The
facts could not justify the creation of a common law parent-child
communication privilege. 13 9
The court was careful to limit its decision to accommodate the
witness's first amendment rights. Rather than protecting all confi-
dential intrafamily communications, the religiously based privilege
exempts parents from testifying against their children only when
the parents' religion prohibits such testimony.1 0 Although the
mother in Greenberg stated that any incriminating evidence she
may have had was received in confidence, the privilege only ex-
empted her from disclosing incriminating evidence. 4 ' Declining to
create a parent-child privilege protecting all confidential communi-
cations, the court still implicitly left the issue open for future con-
sideration. One factor that influenced the court not to create a
common law privilege in Greenberg was the daugher's age. Citing
A and M, the court held that confidential, non-incriminating com-
137. Id. at 586-87. The court pointed out that Mrs. Greenberg's daughter did not live
with her mother and maintained only sporadic contact. Id. at 586.
138. Id. at 587.
139. See id. Nevertheless, the court left no doubt that it had the power to create a com-
mon law testimonial privilege by relying on Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
which provides that privileges "shall be governed by the principles of the common law as
they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experi-
ence." FED. R. EviD. 501. For additional support, the court cited Trammel v. United States,
445 U.S. 40 (1980) (modifying the husband-wife adverse testimony privilege), and United
States v. Arthur Young & Co., 10 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. (Callaghan) 906 (2d Cir. 1982) (creat-
ing a limited common law accountant work-product privilege).
140. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Greenberg), 11 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. (Callaghan)
579, 581 (D. Conn. 1982). The court's election to label the privilege recognized in this case as
a "parent-child privilege" is misleading. The primary purpose of the privilege recognized in
Greenberg is the protection of the religious rights of the witness. See supra notes 131-32
and accompanying text. Protection of the parent-child relationship here is merely incidental
to protection of the mother's free exercise of religion. See infra note 141.
141. In re Greenberg, 11 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. (Callaghan) 579, 584 (D. Conn. 1982). The
Jewish tenet forbidding testimony by a parent against his child is not limited to testimony
based on confidential communications. See id. at 581. The court's broad grant of a privilege
against compelled testimony on incriminating matters implicitly acknowledges as much.
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munications from an adult offspring were not protected.142 The
reasoning implies that federal courts still may recognize a parent-
child privilege for communications from minor children.14
In re Agosto
Six months after In re Greenberg, the United States District
Court for the District of Nevada explicitly recognized an expansive
common law parent-child testimonial privilege. In re Agosto1""
arose from a motion to quash a subpoena ad testificandum1 45 is-
sued to the thirty-two-year-old son 46 of an alleged tax evader. 47
The son argued that enforcement of the subpoena would cause im-
permissible harm both to his interests and to those of society. The
court divided these harms into three categories.1 48 First, compel-
ling the son to testify against his father would harm him as an
individual. Forcing a breach of confidence, the son argued, would
damage his emotional, psychological, and physical health.149 He
also contended that compelling him to testify against his father
would violate his right to the free exercise of his religion because
his Roman Catholic faith required him to "honor his father and
mother."1 50 Second, the son contended that testifying would harm
his family life, especially relations with his father.151 He argued
142. Id. at 586-87; see supra text accompanying notes 138-39. A possible explanation of
the court's choice of the term "parent-child privilege" for the religiously based privilege
recognized in Greenberg, as well as the court's generally favorable treatment of A and M, is
that the court wished to lay a foundation for future recognition of a common law parent-
child privilege. See supra note 140.
143. Id.
144. 553 F. Supp. 1298 (D. Nev. 1983).
145. Id. at 1299. Agosto moved alternatively for a protective order preventing his interro-
gation concerning any matter that might be presented to the grand jury against his father.
146. German, Family Privilege Broadened, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 24, 1983, at 3, col. 1. The
court failed to indicate Charles Agosto's age.
147. Id. The Las Vegas strike force conducted the investigation. U.S. Justice Department
attorney's intimated that the son was involved in the tax evasion schemes alleged to have
been perpetrated by his father, a "reputed mob figure." See id. at 3-9.
148. See In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1300 (D. Nev. 1983).
149. See id.
150. See id. Although the son advanced a religious basis for his claim to the parent-child
privilege, the court did not use this rationale to justify the privilege that it created. Agosto
does not mention Greenberg, probably because Greenberg had not been reported when the
Agosto opinion was written.
151. See id.
1984]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
that the parent-child relationship is at least as close and as valua-
ble to society as the husband-wife relationship, which is protected
by a privilege.152 Furthermore, he contended that his age was irrel-
evant because the parent-child relationship continues beyond the
child's minority.153
The third potential harm from compelling the son to testify con-
cerned society itself. The son particularly relied on the United
States Supreme Court's regard for the integrity and sanctity of the
family, highlighted in its cases recognizing a constitutional right to
family privacy.154 Pointedly, the son supported his motion to quash
with affidavits demonstrating that the demand for his appearance
marked the third occasion in eighteen months that federal prose-
cutors in Nevada had subpoenaed children to testify against their
parents.
1 55
Deriving its authority from Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence,15 the court recognized the parent-child privilege after an
extensive analysis of commentary and caselaw, 57 constitutional is-
sues,15 8 and policy concerns. 159 Accordingly, the court granted the
son's motion to quash the subpoena. 60 Noting the inconsistency of
granting a privilege to husbands and wives but not to parents and
children,161 the court held that the government's goal of presenting
all relevant evidence does not outweigh "an individual's right of
privacy in his communications within the family unit, nor does it
outweigh the family's interest in its integrity and inviolability.
16 2
Agosto broadened the scope of the parent-child privilege by pro-
tecting communications from the parent as well as communications
from the child. The court reasoned that because the privilege
152. See id. at 1302.
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. See id. at 1299. The potential for abuse of this tactic by grand juries weighed heavily
in the court's opinion. See id. at 1330.
156. See id. at 1325 ("this court is free [under Rule 501] to extend the law of privileges to
deal with those situations encountered in which constitutional protection is deemed essen-
tial"); see also supra note 139.
157. See In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1302-10 (D. Nev. 1983).
158. See id. at 1310-12.
159. See id. at 1312-22.
160. See id. at 1325.
161. See id. at 1325.
162. Id.
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"springs from a relationship which is both mutual and reciprocal,
it would be logically inconsistent to allow the coerced testimony of
either parent or child against the other."''6 3 In this respect, the
parent-child privilege recognized in Agosto is closer to of the hus-
band-wife communications privilege than to the professional privi-
leges. Marital communications deriving from either spouse are pro-
tected,"6 4  whereas professional privileges protect only the
layperson's communications.165
Reciprocity is a feature that is new to the parent-child privilege.
Earlier cases dealt only with children's communications to their
parents. 6 The privilege developed as a means to allow the child to
speak freely. 6 7 Commentators consider this the underlying policy
of the privilege and reject the reciprocal privilege that protects the
parent's confidences as well.' 8 Nevertheless, the court in Agosto
maintained that the protection of private communications within
the parent-child relationship should not depend on the direction of
the speech.'69 Agosto also is the first case to recognize a parent-
child privilege against compelled adverse testimony not involving
communications. The court ruled that the son could claim the par-
ent-child privilege not only to protect confidential communications
from his father; but also to protect "against being compelled to be
a witness and testify adversely against his father in any criminal
proceeding."' 170 The court thus expanded the parent-child privilege
by modeling it after the rule of spousal immunity from adverse
163. Id. at 1328 (emphasis in original).
164. See supra text accompanying notes 62-66.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 18-49.
166. Some of the courts that declined to recognize a parent-child privilege did analyze
factual scenarios resembling that in Agosto. For example, In re Starr, 647 F.2d 511 (5th Cir.
1981), concerned a witness's refusal to testify against her mother and stepfather. The court
rejected the witness's claim of the parent-child privilege for lack of federal precedent and
affirmed the civil contempt order. Id. at 512-13.
167. See generally In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Greenburg), 11 Fed. R. Evid. Sew.
(Callaghan) 579 (D. Conn. 1982); In re A and M, 61 A.D.2d 426, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1978); People v. Fitzgerald, 101 Misc. 2d 712, 422 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Westehester
County Ct. 1979).
168. See, e.g., Stanton, supra note 1, at 64-65; Comment, Recognition of Privilege, supra
note 1, at 685.
169. See In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1325-28 (D. Nev. 1983).
170. Id. at 1325.
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testimony enunciated in Trammel.'7' Agosto stands for the pro-
position that neither child nor parent can be compelled to testify
adversely to the other on any matter in a criminal proceeding.
172
The parent-child testimonial privilege announced in Agosto is
the broadest and most far-reaching to date. The court placed the
parent-child privilege on a par with the husband-wife privilege rec-
ognized in the federal courts. The privilege not only protects confi-
dential communications from either party regardless of age but
also prevents the compulsion of adverse testimony on any matter
in a criminal proceeding.
ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Courts that have considered the parent-child privilege disagree
on whether the privilege does or should exist. Many courts that
have refused to recognize the privilege have done so without thor-
ough analysis. 173 Courts are reluctant to recognize novel privileges
even when persuasive justifications support the privilege. 7 4 In ad-
dition, many courts prefer to leave the issue to legislative
initiative.17 5
171. See supra text accompanying notes 59-61.
172. See In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1325-28 (D. Nev. 1983). Contra Three Juveniles
v. Commonwealth, 390 Mass. 357, -, 455 N.E.2d 1203, 1206 (1983). The Supreme Judi-
cial Court of Massachusetts, by a 4-3 vote, held that neither the common law nor the consti-
tutional right to privacy protects minor children from being compelled to testify, over objec-
tion of both children and parents, before a grand jury investigating the possible murder of a
nonfamily member by the father. See id. at 1204-08. Although the court rejected the adverse
testimony privilege recognized in Agosto as an "extreme position," it pointedly reserved
judgment on recognition of a confidential communications privilege. Id.
173. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 683 F.2d 817 (4th Cir. 1982) (refusal to consider the
privilege in case of adult son's non-confidential communications); In re Starr, 647 F.2d 511
(5th Cir. 1981) (citing lack of federal precedent and fact that communication came from
parent); In re Kinoy, 326 F. Supp. 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (no such privilege exists).
174. See, e.g., In re Terry W., 59 Cal. App. 3d 745, 748, 130 Cal. Rptr. 913, 914 (1976)
(refusing to recognize the privilege, absent legislative guidance, despite recognition of per-
suasive arguments for creating the privilege).
175. See, e.g., id. at 749, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 915 ("That the problem is one which should be
addressed legislatively rather than judicially is emphasized by unanswerable questions
whether the 'privilege' should be that of parent, child, or both, how the 'privilege' may be
waived, and what exceptions, if any, to the 'privilege' should exist"); State v. Gilroy, 313
N.W.2d 513 (Iowa 1981) (refusing to recognize the privilege absent statutory authority); cf.
In re A and M, 61 A.D.2d 426, 434-35, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375, 381 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978) (recog-
nizing a limited privilege but deferring to legislature for definitive rule).
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Although many commentators have supported a parent-child
privilege, 1 6 legislators have not.17 7 Consequently, the courts must
address this issue. The broad privilege allowed in Agosto is certain
to encourage many more claims.'7 8 The courts deciding these
claims will face pronounced disagreement concerning the purpose,
scope, and legitimate beneficiaries of the parent-child privilege.
The debate over the privilege involves conflict between several
constitutionally protected interests. Values at the heart of family
life collide with basic tenets of the American law. Analyzing the
problems and policies of the parent-child privilege will help courts
resolve these conflicts.
The Parent-Child Relatwnship and the Need for a Privilege
The parent-child relationship is important to the societal struc-
ture. Parents bear almost complete responsibility for the early so-
cialization of their children, and studies show that this early train-
ing is the most significant influence in the child's development of
both a self image and an ability to interact with society. 7 9 Al-
though other socializing mechanisms, such as school and peer
group activities, play a larger role in children's development as
they grow older, the parent-child relationship remains the most
important influence. This influence often retains its importance
throughout the child's adult life.
A troubled parent-child relationship is directly related to anti-
social and delinquent behavior.' 80 Children of hostile or indifferent
parents often develop poor self-images and seek attention by
resorting to violence.' 81 As they grow older, they may compensate
176. See, e.g., Coburn, supra note 1, at 632-33; Stanton, supra note 1, at 58-60; Comment,
A Proposal, supra note 1, at 807-09; Comment, Recognition of Privilege, supra note 1, at
689-90; Comment, Underprivileged Communications, supra note 1, at 1195.
177. See supra note 11.
178. See, e.g., In re Matthews, Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,544 (2d Cir. 1983). Matthews
wanted to withhold testimony concerning confidential communications received from his in-
laws. He cited both Greenberg and Agosto but the court was not persuaded that an "in-law
privilege" was justified and therefore affirmed the contempt judgment See id.
179. A. COFFEY, THE PREVENTON OF CRna AN DENQUENCY 56 (1975); Clausen, Perspec-
tives on Childhood Socialization m SOC&IZATION AND SocmTY 146 (Clausen ed. 1968).
180. See, e.g., S. GLuECK & E. GLuECK, UNRAvELiNG JumE~mE DENQUENCY 125-27 (1950);
R. TioJmNowicz, JuvENE DELINQUENCY: CONCE S AND CONTROL 76-78 (2d ed. 1978).
181. See Trojanowicz, supra note 180, at 80.
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for their inadequate home lives by forming strong peer-group rela-
tionships. The shared attitude of the peer group may reinforce the
children's antisocial tendencies.182
To effectively guide and counsel their children, parents must es-
tablish a relationship of mutual confidence and trust. If children
are to discuss serious problems with their parents, they must ex-
pect complete confidence. Most jurisdictions, unfortunately, do not
protect private communications between parents and children.183
Courts should not compel disclosure of confidential communica-
tions between minors and their parents concerning matters of
guidance and support. This conclusion is consistent both with the
Wigmore formula and the established privileges. To satisfy Wig-
more's first requirement, a child must communicate with his par-
ents in confidence."" The presence of siblings or other immediate
family members, however, should not compromise the privilege. 8 5
The second part of Wigmore's test requires that confidentiality
be essential to the relationship."' One commentator has argued
that the parent-child privilege does not meet this requirement. Be-
cause the average parent or child is not likely to be aware of it, the
argument goes, the privilege does not encourage open communica-
tion and is unimportant to the relationship.8 7 As noted earlier,
however, commentators have made similar arguments against the
husband-wife communication privilege. 88 Nothing suggests that
married couples generally are unaware of the privilege.189 The lon-
gevity of the marital privilege suggests that couples probably are
aware, at least in a vague way, that marital confidences have legal
protection. If courts recognize a parent-child privilege, it too will
become known through its application.
The third element of Wigmore's test requires that the privileged
182. See Stanton, supra note 1, at 42-43.
183. See supra notes 2-3, 11 and accompanying text.
184. See supra text accompanying note 17.
185. Coburn, supra note 1, at 632; Stanton, supra note 1, at 58; Comment, Constitutional
Privilege, supra note 1, at 1025; Comment, A Proposal, supra note 1, at 690. Most commen-
tators agree that requiring the communications to be made out of the presence of siblings
simply ignores the reality of family life and unnecessarily restricts the privilege.
186. See supra text accompanying note 17.
187. Note, Questioning the Privilege, supra note 1, at 153.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 67-68.
189. See supra text accompanying note 69.
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relationship be one that, in the opinion of the community, ought to
be fostered.190 The parent-child relationship easily meets this stan-
dard, as the opinions in A and M, Fitzgerald, Greenberg, and
Agosto make clear.
Wigmore's fourth element presents the most difficulty. The
harm to the relationship from disclosure of the communications
must outweigh the importance of the information to the litiga-
tion.191 Coerced disclosure could ruin the parent-child relationship
by destroying the child's trust in his parents. Conversely, society
may gain little from compelling parental testimony concerning
conversations with the child.
A parent confronted with the government's demand for his testi-
mony has three options.192 First, he can agree to testify, contribute
to his child's conviction, and possibly destroy their relationship.
Second, he can refuse to testify and be subject to contempt pro-
ceedings. Third, he can agree to testify and then lie to protect his
child. In the first instance, the testimony is gained only through
severe damage to a socially beneficial relationship. If the parent
chooses to protect his child by refusing to testify and then is jailed
for contempt, the state's interest in fact-finding is blocked, and the
parent becomes a prisoner of conscience. Finally, if the parent per-
jures himself, the state does not obtain the facts and the parent is
guilty of a crime.19 3
As a general proposition, then, the government often has consid-
erably more to lose than to gain when it attempts to compel paren-
tal testimony. The situation presents great potential for harm to
the child, to the parent, and to the legal system. This alone indi-
cates the need for a privilege. Nevertheless, courts should limit the
190. See supra text accompanying note 17.
191. See supra text accompanying note 17.
192. Cf. Note, The Husband-Wife Privilege of Testimonial Non-Disclosure, 56 Nw. U.L.
REv. 208, 210 (1961), considering the same three options in regard to a wife called to testify
against her husband.
193. In our democratic system of justice which is based in part on respect for the
law, if the law places family members in a position of choosing between loyalty
to a special, life-long bond as opposed to involuntarily testifying to confidential
and private matters, then the law would not merely be inviting perjury, but
perhaps even forcing it.
In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1326 (D. Nev. 1983); see also Three Juveniles v. Common-
wealth, 390 Mass. 357, , 455 N.E.2d 1203, 1209 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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privilege in deference to the state's need for access to evidence.
Courts have not limited sufficiently four aspects of the privilege.
The Issue of Age
Fitzgerald and Agosto extended the parent-child privilege to
adults."" These decisions identified the policy behind the privilege
to be the protection of the parent-child relationship. Because this
relationship lasts as long as the parties live, age is irrelevant.195 Al-
though this argument is sentimentally appealing and follows logi-
cally from the premise that the privilege exists to protect the par-
ent-child relationship itself, the policies favoring a privilege for
unemancipated minor children do not apply to adults.
Society no doubt has an interest in protecting the relationship
between parents and adult children, but the need for a testimonial
privilege is not compelling. As Greenberg noted, an adult's need
for parental guidance and support is simply not as great as that of
a minor."" 8 Adults can seek professional aid directly. Because of
their lack of experience and money, children must approach their
parents first. Children's statements made to their parents in seek-
ing help deserve the same protection that the statements would
have had if made to a professional. 97
The courts rejecting an age limitation correctly point out that
there is no particular age at which children's emotional depen-
dence on their parents ceases.19 They argue that any age limit is
artificial and arbitrary. 9 This complaint, however, is not sufficient
194. See In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1329; People v. Fitzgerald, 101 Misc. 2d 712,
720, 422 N.Y.S.2d 309, 314 (Westchester County Ct. 1979).
195. See In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1328-29 (D. Nev. 1983); People v. Fitzgerald,
101 Misc. 2d 712, 718-20, 422 N.Y.S.2d 309, 313-14 (Westchester County Ct. 1979).
196. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Greenberg), 11 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. (Callaghan)
579, 586-87 (D. Conn. 1982); see also Stanton, supra note 1, at 63-65.
197. Cf. De Los Santos v. Superior Ct., 101 Cal. App. 3d 870, 161 Cal. Rptr. 882 (1980)
(allowing information disclosed by a minor to his mother to qualify as a confidential attor-
ney-client communication because the mother asked the questions at the attorney's re-
quest). For a thorough discussion of the problems of implementing minors' rights against
self-incrimination, see Stanton, supra note 1, at 27-37.
198. See In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1329 (D. Nev. 1983); People v. Fitzgerald, 101
Misc. 2d 712, 718, 422 N.Y.S.2d 309, 313 (Westchester County Ct. 1979).
199. "It can even be argued that there is a role reversal in the parent-child relationship,
as the parent grows older and becomes more reliant on the child." In re Agosto, 553 F.
Supp. 1298, 1329 (D. Nev. 1983).
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to allow the law to ignore the difference between children and
adults. As children grow older, they develop more associations. Al-
though these outside contacts may never supplant entirely rela-
tionships with their parents, the parents' role as the primary shap-
ing force in the children's lives ends. As adult offspring leave home
and become less dependent on their parents, they develop other
financial and emotional resources. The need for parent-child confi-
dentiality then becomes less compelling.
Courts should restrict the parent-child privilege to communica-
tions made by minor children. Although this restriction requires an
arbitrary limitation on the life of the privilege, the changed cir-
cumstances of adulthood justify termination of the privilege. Some
age limit is necessary, and courts reasonably can use the age of
majority commonly accepted in other contexts. 00
The Issue of Reciprocity
Agosto extended the parent-child privilege to confidences re-
vealed by either parent or child.20 1 Because the parent-child rela-
tionship is reciprocal, the court contended that the privilege must
protect both parties. Agosto's reasoning is not compelling on this
point. The court failed to consider the differences between the hus-
band-wife and the parent-child relationships.
Husbands and wives today generally are considered equal part-
ners, legally and socially. A husband-wife privilege must be recip-
rocal to achieve its purpose because the confidential communica-
tions come from both parties. Although the parent-child
relationship shares similarities with the husband-wife relationship,
the nature of the two relationships is fundamentally different. The
interaction between a parent and a child is in some sense mutual
and reciprocal, but the parties are not equal during the minority of
the child. The parent is strong, experienced, and knowledgeable;
200. See Stanton, supra note 1, at 58, 64.
201. In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1328 (D. Nev. 1983) ("This Court sees no reason to
draw a distinction, affording protection for a child's communications to his parent, while yet
affording no protection for a parent's communication to his child."); cf. Three Juveniles v.
Commonwealth, 390 Mass. 357, , 455 N.E.2d 1203, 1206 (1983) ("Because a parent does
not need the advice of a minor child in the same sense that a child may need the advice of a
parent, the case for a testimonial privilege as to confidential communications from parent to
child seems weaker than the case as to such a communication from child to parent.").
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the child comes to the parent seeking help, sympathy, and under-
standing. Thus, a parent stands more in the position of a profes-
sional to a client than of a spouse to another spouse.
The better approach is to make the parent-child privilege non-
reciprocal because of its greater similarity to the professional privi-
leges. The professional has no privilege on his own behalf because
his role is to listen to the confidences of others; those seeking assis-
tance need the assurance of privacy to encourage an atmosphere of
free communication. Similarly, the parent-child context requires a
privilege only for the child's communications and those responses
of the parent that might reveal them. Communications by the par-
ent not concerned with the guidance of the child therefore should
remain unprotected. The policy underlying the privilege should not
extend to communications unrelated to the child's needs.
The Adverse Testimony Issue
Agosto also extended the parent-child privilege by exempting
parents and children from testifying against each other, regardless
of whether the testimony concerns confidential communications.0 2
The rationale supporting this extension of the privilege is the need
to protect the parent-child relationship itself, rather than the need
to protect the privacy to communicate.0 3
Assuming that an adverse-testimony privilege is necessary to
protect the husband-wife relationship,2 °' such an expansion of the
parent-child privilege is unwarranted. The parent-child privilege
grew out of the need to prevent the parent from becoming an un-
willing informant of the child's admissions.20 5 The Agosto adverse-
testimony privilege would give both the parent and the child the
power to withhold adverse testimony on subjects unrelated to pa-
202. See In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1325 (D. Nev. 1983).
203. See id. at 1328. The court argued that a privilege against adverse testimony was
necessary in addition to the communication privilege to maintain the privacy, integrity, and
inviolability of the family relationship. See id. The court mixed its arguments for the ad-
verse testimony privilege with its arguments for the reciprocal communications privilege.
Because these privileges are not the same, the court's conclusions concerning the adverse
testmony privilege are questionable.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 55-56.
205. See, e.g., In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1328 (D. Nevada 1983); Coburn, supra
note 1, at 616-17.
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rental guidance. To give a parent or a child the power to withhold
testimony concerning the other's actions, whereabouts, and non-
confidential conversations extends the privilege far beyond its pur-
pose and invites abuse. Although any adverse testimony can dam-
age the parent-child relationship, courts should limit the privilege
to the crucial area of communications for the emotional and disci-
plinary guidance of the child. The need for privacy is the greatest
in this situation, and the likelihood of criminal abuse the least. A
blanket adverse-testimony privilege is undesirable not only be-
cause it is unsupported by sound policy but also because it is too
intrusive on the state's ability to gather evidence.206
The Joint Privilege-Independent Privilege Issue
Assuming that the parent-child privilege belongs to the minor
child and that a parent may claim the privilege on behalf of the
child, the question remains whether both parent and child must
assert the privilege. Generally the power to waive a privilege for
confidential communications rests solely with the communicating
party. Thus, the client may silence the attorney regardless of the
attorney's willingness to testify about the client's confidences.0
Similarly, either spouse may prevent the other from revealing their
confidential communications. 08 Nevertheless, A and M suggested
that courts should restrict operation of the parent-child privilege
to those instances in which not just the child but all family mem-
bers wish to assert the privilege.20 9 Fitzgerald also indicated that
the parent may waive the privilege over the objection of the child
in some situations.2 10 The court in Fitzgerald best articulated the
justification for this approach, observing that a jointly held parent-
child privilege is appropriate because it allows the parent to obtain
the court's aid in reinforcing the parents' authority over the
206. Accord Three Juveniles v. Commonwealth, 390 Mass. 357, -, 455 N.E.2d 1203,
1207-08 (1983).
207. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 14, § 2321.
208. See supra text accompanying note 62.
209. See In re A and M, 61 A.D.2d 426, 435 n.9, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375, 381 n.9 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1978).
210. See People v. Fitzgerald, 101 Misc. 2d 712, 721, 422 N.Y.S.2d 309, 315 (Westchester
County Ct. 1979).
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child.211 In this situation, courts should allow the parents to over-
ride the child's privilege because the state is fostering the parent-
child relationship rather than invading it.2 12
Although the courts that have considered this issue favor a
jointly held privilege, commentators are in disagreement. Some
support Fitzgerald's position. They contend that parents should
control the privilege because they are best situated to evaluate
their children's interests.213 Making the child the sole holder of the
privilege may interfere with the parents' right to control the up-
bringing of the child by removing the parents' influence over the
child.21 4 Furthermore, the need for a privilege arguably diminishes
when the parents' testimony is voluntary rather than compelled.21 5
Other authorities, however, insist that the child should hold the
privilege.2 16 The rationale is that the child's interests will receive
superior protection with the assistance of counsel.21 7 More specifi-
cally, one proponent of an independent privilege to be held solely
by the child urges that the child's liberty interest outweighs the
parents' interest in maintaining authority once the state charges a
child with a crime.21 s Because only testimony concerning communi-
cations is precluded, parents still may testify to their children's
whereabouts and activities. In addition, even though the parents
may not force the child to waive the privilege, they still may try to
persuade the child to allow their testimony.21 9 Thus, the establish-
ment of an independently held privilege would not eliminate whol-
ly the parents' influence.
Because the primary purpose of the parent-child privilege is to
encourage children to confide in their parents, the best course is to
make children the sole holders of the privilege. If the operation of
a privilege depends on someone other than the communicating
party, the communicating party no longer has any assurance that
211. See supra text accompanying notes 108-10.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 108-10.
213. See Comment, Constitutional Privilege, supra note 1, at 1027; Comment, Recogni-
tion of Privilege, supra note 1, at 685-86.
214. See Comment, Constitutional Privilege, supra note 1, at 1028.
215. Comment, A Proposal, supra note 1, at 806.
216. See, e.g., Coburn, supra note 1, at 632; Stanton, supra note 1, at 60-62.
217. Stanton, supra note 1, at 62.
218. See id. at 61-62.
219. Id. at 62.
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others will keep their confidences. Such a contingent privilege will
not adequately promote open communications. Furthermore, par-
ents have private and public means to reassert control over their
children other than by threatening to disclose confidences. Even if
allowing parental disclosure might be the best solution in a partic-
ular instance, the resulting uncertainty would reduce the overall
effectiveness of the privilege.
CONCLUSION
Courts have begun to recognize a need for a parent-child testi-
monial privilege to prevent undue state interference in family life
and to protect and encourage free communication between chil-
dren and their parents. The privilege has been expanded progres-
sively by the few courts that have recognized it. This expansion
has produced a privilege removed from the policies from which it
originated. As is true of all testimonial privileges, the parent-child
privilege obstructs the search for truth and should be limited
strictly. The privilege should be restricted to communications
made by a minor child to his parents in an effort to obtain their
guidance and support. Because a blanket privilege against adverse
testimony would hamper the investigation of evidence in areas un-
related to the child's guidance, courts should reject an adverse-tes-
timony privilege. The child, however, should be the sole holder of
the privilege. This will ensure that the privilege shields confiden-
tial communications made by children to obtain parental guidance,
which in turn will encourage the trust essential to the parent-child
relationship.
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